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Abstract 
Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have the potential for a large 
array of highly-beneficial applications.  These applications are too 
numerous to comprehensively list, but include search and rescue, fire 
spotting, precision agriculture, etc. to name a few.  Typically sUAS 
vehicles weigh less than 55 lbs and will be performing flight operations in 
the National Air Space (NAS). Certain sUAS applications, such as 
package delivery, will include operations in the close proximity of the 
general public.  The full benefit from sUAS is contingent upon the 
resolution of several technological areas in order to provide an acceptable 
level of risk for widespread sUAS operations.  Operations of sUAS 
vehicles pose risks to people and property on the ground as well as 
manned aviation.  Several of the more significant sUAS technological 
areas include, but are not limited to: autonomous sense and avoid and 
deconfliction of sUAS from other sUAS and manned aircraft, 
communications and interfaces between the vehicle and human operators, 
and the overall reliability of the sUAS and constituent subsystems.  While 
all of the technological areas listed contribute significantly to the safe 
execution of the sUAS flight operations, contingency or emergency 
systems can greatly contribute to sUAS risk mitigations to manage 
situations where the vehicle is in distress.  The Safe2Ditch (S2D) system 
is an autonomous crash management system for sUAS.  Its function is to 
enable sUAS to execute emergency landings and avoid injuring people on 
the ground, damaging property, and lastly preserving the sUAS and 
payload. A sUAS flight test effort was performed to test the integration of 
sub-elements of the S2D system with a representative sUAS multi-rotor.
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Nomenclature 
Ah Amp hour, unit of measure of 
the amount of battery capacity 
AOSP Airspace Operations and Safety 
Program 
AGL Above Ground Level 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
BVLOS Beyond Visual Line of Sight 
BYU Brigham Young University 
CERTAIN City Environment Range for 
Testing Autonomous Integrated 
Navigation 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
DSS Ditch Site Selector 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FOV Horizontal Field of View 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis 
fps Frames Per Second 
GA General Aviation 
GCS Ground Control Station 
GCSO Ground Control Station 
Operator 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HMI Health Monitor Interface 
IH Intelligent Hub 
LaRC Langley Research Center 
LSV Landing Site Verifier 
MR Multi-Rotor 
NAS National Air Space 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
NRO Nav/Route Optimizer 
ppd Pixels per degree 
R-RANSAC Recursive-Random Sample 
Consensus 
SAA Sense and Avoid 
SP Safety Pilot 
sUAS Small Unmanned Aerial System 
R/C Radio Control 
ROI Region of Interest 
RSO Range Safety Officer 
RTL Return to Launch 
S2D Safe2Ditch or Safe2Ditch 
TOD Top of Descent 
UTM UAS Traffic Management 
VAL Vision Assisted Landing 
WVLOS Within Visual Line of Sight 
 
Introduction 
Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have been 
studied by private industry and government and the 
results indicate a large array of potentially-beneficial 
applications.  It is widely recognized that sUAS (i.e.; 
those that weigh less than 55lbs) can provide 
significant benefit.  Those benefits include a growing 
array of applications from traffic monitoring to fire 
spotting and even small package delivery. 
The introduction of sUAS into the National 
Airspace System (NAS) has been an objective of 
several research efforts.   In order for sUAS to reach 
their full potential, multiple technological issues must 
be resolved, along with a comprehensive assessment of 
risk from these new and revolutionary vehicles, in 
order to avoid exposing the public to undue risks from 
sUAS operations.  These risks could involve mid-air 
collisions of sUAS with each other or with manned 
aircraft, or risks associated with direct collision of 
sUAS with people and property on the ground. 
One area of technology development is in a traffic 
management system that can deconflict sUAS while 
imposing limitations to where the vehicles can operate 
to help mitigate, but not eliminate, the risk to manned 
aircraft.  The NASA UAS Traffic Management (UTM) 
project has been developing a traffic management 
system for sUAS along with a concept of operations 
(CONOPS) as described in Reference 1. 
Within Reference 1 several differences between 
traditional manned aircraft and sUAS are noted, such 
as the absence of an onboard pilot to detect and avoid 
other vehicles.  Second, there is a wide range of new 
and unknown sUAS performance characteristics, and 
third, sUAS are by definition small and lightweight 
and do not have the capability to carry heavy or power-
intensive equipment regardless of the equipment’s 
function.  Finally, Reference 1 states that while sUAS 
may fly very close to each other under certain 
circumstances, the biggest risk is to the people and 
assets on the ground, and to manned aviation. 
Other significant differences between manned 
aviation and sUAS also need to be noted.  For 
example, it is also important to note that the role of the 
pilot in manned aviation extends beyond avoiding 
other air traffic and also includes aeronautical 
decision-making (Reference 2) both for nominal and 
off-nominal or emergency operations.  Manned aircraft 
pilots are continuously monitoring the vehicle’s flight 
path, performance, and status of subsystems with 
consideration of deteriorating weather, failing/off-
nominal system performance, and other circumstances. 
SUAS offer many benefits as previously presented.  
However, many of the benefits of sUAS can be 
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provided by manned aircraft or from other 
transportation methods, such as ground transportation 
for package delivery.  Therefore, a critical enabling 
characteristic of an sUAS transportation systems is the 
potentially low-cost of acquisition and operation of 
these vehicles.  Highly expensive sUAS will not likely 
be commercially viable as their costs could be 
commensurate with manned aviation.  While sUAS 
provide risk mitigation to loss of human life due to the 
absence of a pilot, more widespread and prolific 
implementation of sUAS requires monetary 
commercial benefits and/or massive improvements in 
convenience and service. 
Another significant difference between sUAS 
operations and manned aircraft operations is the lack 
of reliability data for critical systems and 
subcomponents.  Small, lightweight, and low-cost 
sUAS vehicles are comprised of many new and 
revolutionary components.  For example, autopilots 
and attitude reference systems are based on micro-
sensor technologies and augmented with GPS 
adjustments.  Data for these systems is limited 
compared to their manned aircraft counterparts, and 
mean-time-to failure data does not exist. 
In the event of an emergency, such as an engine 
failure for a single-engine aircraft, the manned aircraft 
pilot executes a specific list of actions to optimally 
configure the aircraft for an emergency landing and 
rapidly determines and selects an adequate (or the best) 
emergency landing location.  Successful emergency 
landings of manned aircraft in open fields or roads are 
examples of pilots saving themselves, avoiding injury 
to those on the ground, and often also saving the 
aircraft as discussed in Reference 3.  As a result, the 
risk of manned aviation to the general public is 
significantly mitigated through the pilots’ actions in 
emergency situations. 
 While the accident rate for general aviation as 
performed and tracked under the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) FAR Part-91 and commercial 
transport operations performed under Part-135 is not, it 
is still considered an acceptable form of transportation 
to air travelers and to the general public on the ground 
because the risk is similar to other forms of 
transportation.  For sUAS to be fully-accepted as a 
means of transport, risk from these vehicles must also 
be similarly commensurate with other forms of 
transportation. 
Presently, the FAA permits limited operations 
within-visual-line-of-sight (WVLOS) under Part-107 
regulations to manage risks from sUAS operations.  
SUAS operators are permitted to operate their WVLOS 
aircraft at altitudes less than 400ft above ground level 
(AGL), at speeds less than 100mph, and at operational 
locations sufficiently far away from airports.  General 
WVLOS visual limitations range out to ~1 mile 
depending on the size of the vehicle. 
While WVLOS operations can provide substantial 
benefit and include applications such as construction 
monitoring, real estate, limited precision agriculture 
and infrastructure monitoring and other d beneficial 
applications require sUAS operations beyond-visual-
line-of-sight (BVLOS) and/or include multiple sUAS 
operated by a single person. The FAA does permit 
some very limited BVLOS operations through a waiver 
process that requires applicants to perform extensive 
safety and risk analysis of the specific proposed flights. 
During WVLOS operations, the human operator is 
responsible for visually assuring that the sUAS will 
avoid manned aircraft and other sUAS, avoid 
overflight of unprotected people on the ground, and be 
able to intervene in the event of vehicle system issues 
to mitigate risk.  BVLOS operations place an added 
emphasis on the vehicles’ systems as real-time human 
intervention is much harder or even impossible in 
some situations due to time constraints. 
Risk for sUAS operations needs to be quantified 
and managed in order to permit routine BVLOS flight 
operations.  The risk from sUAS operations to people 
on the ground and manned aviation can be assessed 
through traditional risk assessment procedures as 
described in References 4 and 5.  Within these 
references the risks are analyzed through a probability 
and threat methodology.  Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) is one method of assessing risk as 
defined in Reference 5.  Critical ingredients to 
successful risk assessment are valid and accurate 
probabilities for a subcomponent or system failure to 
occur along with realistic effects.  Given the new and 
untested nature of sUAS, both the probabilities of 
failure and effects are largely unknown as discussed in 
Reference 5.  Also given the low cost and light weight 
typical of sUAS designs, the failure rate of sUAS 
subsystems is assumed to be very high, potentially 
several orders of magnitude above manned general 
aviation. 
The combination of the anticipated high rates of 
sUAS failure with their envisioned use cases to 
frequently bring the vehicles in close proximity to the 
public require the mitigation of risk of sUAS 
operations.  Risk mitigations can take many forms. 
Some, such as redundant systems or emergency 
systems like parachutes, can lead to significantly 
increased weight and decreased payload that limits 
vehicle performance. 
Autonomous emergency landing systems have been 
proposed and defined previously in References 3, and 
6 through 9.  The systems defined in these references 
provide various methods for providing the pilot with 
situational awareness regarding available landing 
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locations along with automated systems to route 
vehicles to usable roads and potential runways. 
 
The Safe2Ditch concept  
Autonomous emergency landing systems as 
described in References 3, and 6 through 8, provide 
significant safety benefits to piloted aircraft while also 
largely avoiding weight impact to the vehicle.  An 
autonomous crash management system is proposed and 
referred to as Safe2Ditch (S2D) and is designed to 
provide this same benefit for unmanned aircraft, 
including response to emulate that of a pilot.   
The S2D system provides autonomous crash 
management capability for sUAS to identify an 
emergency in progress, locate a viable landing/crash 
site, and fly the vehicle to the ground while 
maneuvering to avoid people in its path if necessary.  
For a pilotless vehicle, the risk to people on the ground 
from overflights of sUAS is potentially mitigated by 
providing a level of contingency management onboard 
the vehicle, mimicking the role of the pilot for manned 
aviation.  The S2D system’s priority order is 1) the 
safety of people on the ground, 2) safety of property on 
the ground, and 3) the safety of the vehicle, itself.  The 
system provides an alternative to having the sUAS 
simply fall out of the sky at random locations when 
failures occur or potentially heavy safety systems such 
as parachutes. 
By residing directly on the vehicle, S2D can 
respond immediately to off-nominal situations without 
having to communicate with remote personnel. This 
minimizes requirements to the vehicle’s 
communication system as well as accelerates response 
time. The S2D system was also designed to leverage 
components already resident on many sUAS vehicles, 
which is critical to minimizing weight to preserve 
payload capacity of the host vehicle. In early 
discussions with potential commercial customers, 
weight of such a system was the single most important 
criteria for acceptance of a safety system like S2D 
because of the potential impact to payload. This makes 
one potential configuration of S2D as an auxiliary 
autopilot mode particularly impactful since it could be 
implemented simply through software resulting with 
no additional weight penalty to the vehicle. 
The Safe2Ditch system is comprised of several 
functionalities as portrayed in Figure 1. At the center 
of S2D is the Intelligent Hub (IH).  The IH serves to 
integrate information from the other subsystems and 
performs timing and communication.  The Health 
Monitor (HM) processes inputs from onboard sensors 
and systems and compares that data to expected states 
to identify impending emergencies.  The HM triggers 
S2D engagement when needed, provides an estimate of 
the remaining time-to-fly, and identifies vehicle 
maneuvering limitations. 
The Ditch Site Selector (DSS) triages a list of 
landing site options to determine the best site based on 
the vehicles’ condition and estimated flight time 
remaining. If no pre-determined sites are within the 
disabled vehicle’s range, the vehicle immediately 
begins its descent from the current location. The DSS 
may dynamically change sites if needed as the flight 
progresses. 
The Nav/Route Optimizer (NRO) generates the 
best flight plan to the selected ditch site to conform to 
vehicle or airspace constraints and to maximize the 
view of the ditch site by the on-board camera.  The 
NRO provides a set of waypoints to the autopilot to fly 
to. 
If the vehicle is equipped with a camera system, the 
Vision Assisted Landing (VAL) scans the ditch site 
during approach and looks for unexpected occupancy, 
particularly by people. If the vehicle is equipped with 
an infrared camera, this could also be inferred from 
heat signatures. It is assumed that many vehicles will 
be equipped with at least low-cost electro optical 
cameras. The VAL in the current S2D prototype 
identifies objects in motion, which implies people, 
animals, or vehicles. The potential use of an audible 
warning could help incite the movement.  The VAL 
passes this information to the DSS which may decide 
to re-route to another ditch site if deemed a better 
choice. If the vehicle is unable to re-route, S2D uses its 
own “steer-to-clear” mode to avoid the obstacles. 
Adaptive controls are also included within the S2D 
concept.  Within this context adaptive controls can 
provide an array of potential needed vehicle 
functionality.  For example, it has shown in Reference 
5 that during engine failure conditions for multi-rotors, 
vehicles can still maintain controlled flight within 
limited conditions.  These limits include limiting, or 
avoiding, any rotational heading control of the vehicle, 
which is a possible mode of operations.  S2D would 
need to inform the autopilot to operate in a controlled-
limited manner.  Adaptive controls can also provide 
many other positive attributes for fixed-wing vehicles 
where all available controls can be used in non-
traditional means (i.e. flaps providing limited pitch 
and/or roll control). The objectives of the adaptive 
controls would be to provide limited, but useful, 
control of the vehicle to execute safe emergency 
landings. 
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Figure 1 - S2D functional system portrayal. 
Developmental and integration testing was 
performed in 2016 through 2018 at NASA Langley 
Research Center (LaRC) in Hampton, VA.  The 
objectives of the testing were to 1) demonstrate the 
feasibility of the S2D system on a representative 
sUAS, 2) evaluate the performance of a prototype 
VAL, and 3) evaluate the integration of S2D elements 
along with a representative autopilot. 
 
Method and approach to integrated 
flight testing 
A prototype S2D system was developed, installed 
and tested on a representative sUAS.  All of the S2D 
subsystems were included in the test effort.  Resource 
and time constraints prevented prototyping of a full 
system, so these tests prioritized systems considered to 
pose the greatest risk to the concept’s success, with 
minimal functionality included for low-risk 
components. For example, the earliest software 
prototype version demonstrated selection of a site by 
the DSS and navigation to that site by the NRO using 
available interfaces to existing inexpensive commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) autopilots. The second version 
added the VAL recognition of moving ground objects, 
and the third integrated that visual recognition to the 
DSS rerouting capability.  
Flight vehicle 
The vehicle selected for initial prototype testing 
was a 3DR Y-6 hexacopter shown in Figure 2.  It was 
selected because it represented the small, inexpensive 
vehicle style targeted for the S2D concept, and because 
of its availability as an existing sUAS at LaRC 
(N516NU). The Y-6 meets the research payload 
requirements while also achieving flight endurance 
objectives of typical sUAS missions (e.g. infrastructure 
inspection).  This vehicle was also capable of carrying 
the required research equipment while maintaining 
minimum endurance performance.  The Y-6 was 
equipped with a Pixhawk autopilot running APM 
v3.5.4 firmware with standard Pixhawk/Ardupilot 
configuration. 
The Y-6 was also equipped with a Spektrum 2.4 
gHz R/C communication link for safety pilot control 
and 900 mHz telemetry link for ground station 
monitoring of future waypoints and mode changes.  A 
ruggedized laptop interfaced with the Pixhawk 
autopilot and operated the vehicle in auto mode.  The 
stock weight of the Y-6 is approximately 4.5 lbs with 
an approximate 16-minute endurance using a 4-cell 6.8 
Amp hour (Ah) battery.  The on-board research system 
was comprised of a Jetson TX-2 computer and camera 
that weighed approximately 1 lb.  The resulting vehicle 
configured for research operations weighed 
approximately 5.5 lbs with 8 minutes endurance and 
30% battery reserve in the research configuration.  
 
 
 
Figure 2- 3DR Y-6 research vehicle with research computer 
and camera installed. 
Camera assembly 
The camera and lens used for testing was an 
Imaging Development Systems UI-1250ML shown in 
Figure 3.  The camera features a USB 2.0 interface to 
provide easy access to camera parameters, supply 
power to the camera, and transmit the image data.  The 
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camera is an industrial compact design and provides 
high-resolution imagery (1600x1200) at up to 17 
frames per second (fps).  The UI-1250ML features a 
global shutter to minimize imagery distortion due to 
vehicle motion and vibration.  A 12 millimeter lens 
was selected that provided a 30-degree horizontal field 
of view (FOV).  Overall weight of the camera and lens 
was 70 grams or approximately 2.5 ounces.  A 3D 
printed nylon camera mount was designed, fabricated, 
and installed with rubber vibration isolators as shown 
in Figure 2 located at the front of the vehicle.  The 
mount orients the camera downwards at an angle of 45 
degrees.  The camera orientation provides a potential 
worst-case sUAS camera system due to limited fixed 
FOV and lack of hardware implemented (i.e. camera 
gimbal) image stabilization. For the testing the camera 
was operated at a resolution of 800x600 at 30 fps.  
This was important to stay consistent with limitations 
expected in small commercial applications for concept 
feasibility. The resulting pixel per degree (ppd) was 
27. 
 
Figure 3 - UI-1250ML camera and lens 
 
Jetson TX-2 research computer 
The Jetson TX-2 features an integrated 256-core 
NVIDIA tm Pascal General Processor Unit (GPU), 
hex-core ARMv8 64-bit CPU complex, and 8GB of 
LPDDR4 memory with a 128-bit interface. The CPU 
complex combines dual-core NVIDIA Denver 2 
alongside a quad-core ARM Cortext-A47.  The Jetson 
TX-2 fits a small size, weight, and power (SWaP) 
footprint of 50x87mm (2”x3.4”), 85 grams (3 ounces), 
and requires only 7.5 watts of power.  The TX-2 was 
configured with an Orbitty carrier board to provide 
required input and output interfaces.  The entire 
assembly was contained in a 3D printed nylon vented 
enclosure and Velcro strapped to the top of the vehicle.  
Interfacing with the Pixhawk was via a UART cable 
into the Pixhawk’s telem 2 port.  Figure 4 shows the 
TX-2 research computer alongside the 3D printed 
enclosure. The WiFi antennas were used for ground 
system development and not used for flight testing.   
 
Figure 4 - Jetson TX-2 research computer along with 3D 
printed enclosure and WiFi antennas. 
Human motion simulator 
A primary testing goal was the performance 
evaluation of the VAL S2D subsystem.  This required 
a way to create motion within the targeted ditch site for 
the VAL to detect and report.  In order to achieve this 
without exposing team members to undue risk, a radio 
controlled (R/C) car was employed.  The R/C car 
selected was the Traxas Xmaxx all-terrain truck.  This 
vehicle used electric power, weighed approximately 19 
lbs, and had a top speed of ~50 mph.  For S2D testing, 
speeds were limited to less than 10 mph.  A 1” thick 
foam board was attached to the top of the truck to 
provide a visual cross section approximating that of a 
human being.  Figure 5 presents a photo of the R/C car 
human motion simulator. 
 
 
Figure 5 - R/C car used for S2D testing. 
Safe2Ditch software components 
Time and funding limited the scope of NASA’s 
S2D prototype development and forced judicious 
choices for the subset of functions targeted for 
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prototype testing. A layered implementation plan 
began in 2015 with each iteration created to 
demonstrate feasibility for key systems, and each 
building on prior work. The first tests in 2015 
implemented a basic ditch site selector (DSS) 
component, a minimal navigation/route optimizer 
(NRO), and enough communication in the intelligent 
hub (IH) to access state data from the autopilot and to 
send guidance commands back.  
The 2017 version of the prototype focused on the 
assessment of vision assisted landing (VAL) software. 
These tests informed changes to the vision software 
and supported the planned integration of the DSS and 
VAL components.  
Testing in winter 2018 integrated the prototype 
versions of the DSS and VAL for initial flight testing. 
While the component integration worked, it was not 
user-friendly and design changes in the startup 
sequence later facilitated configuration changes. The 
winter 2018 tests were also adversely impacted by 
hardware issues which caused intermittent lost link 
with the transmitter to trigger return-to-land (RTL) 
mode. Software startup was redesigned between the 
winter and spring 2018 test cycles, and the faulty 
hardware components were replaced. These changes 
significantly streamlined the spring tests, which 
yielded the results later in this report.  
It is important to note that while the current version 
of the prototype is the most complete to date, it still 
represents only a small subset of the functionality of 
the complete Safe2Ditch concept design. The 
following sections describe the envisioned functional 
behaviors of each component, with clarification of the 
subset implemented in the current prototype vehicle. 
Health Monitor (HM) 
The health monitor (HM) is responsible for 
identification of an imminent emergency to trigger 
engagement. An imminent emergency means the 
vehicle’s current performance capability no longer 
allows the vehicle to meet its mission. The HM 
determines the presence of an off-nominal condition 
and attempts to estimate the time remaining for the 
disabled vehicle and provides this to the DSS for use in 
calculating the subset of ditch sites that are reachable. 
Time remaining could be estimated through battery 
monitoring and voltage trends along with other 
potential parameters.  The HM also informs the NRO 
of any performance limitations that could impact path 
construction choices. 
Detection of emergencies due to mechanical 
failures (e.g., servos or motors), power system 
anomalies (e.g., unexpected battery or fuel depletion), 
and severe weather that degrades performance (e.g., 
extreme headwinds) are envisioned for a full 
implementation of the S2D concept. However, the HM 
in the current prototype does not yet contain failure 
detection algorithms. The HM triggers S2D 
engagement when it detects a positive value on a 
specific transmitter switch. This gives the safety pilot 
direct control over the timing of system engagement to 
simplify testing of the DSS and VAL while delaying 
development of those algorithms to future work. 
 
Ditch Site Selector (DSS) 
The ditch site selector (DSS) determines the best 
ditch site to target under the current situation. It 
receives the engagement signal from the HM, along 
with the estimated flight time left for the vehicle (the 
“time-to-crash”). It also receives the current vehicle 
location from the autopilot. The DSS uses a 
performance database for the host vehicle, which for 
the prototype simply estimates the cruise, climb, and 
descent speeds. The performance data and the time-to-
crash allow the DSS to compute the range potential of 
the vehicle at S2D engagement.  
The DSS also uses a database of optional ditch 
sites, which describes the location and size of each site, 
and each site’s probability of being clear of occupants. 
The vehicle’s location and the range potential allow 
the DSS to identify which sites are within range. Of 
those sites that are within range, the DSS identifies the 
site it considers to be the “best” option. Note that the 
best site may not be the closest because distant sites 
with a higher probability of being clear may offer a 
lower risk, if the vehicle has the power to reach them. 
The triage algorithms assign weighting to individual 
factors for range to the site, size of the site, and 
probability of being clear, which are configurable 
before startup and support the selection. 
A mature ditch site database would ideally use 
polygons to define ditch sites. However, the prototype 
version of the ditch site database uses a simple 
latitude/longitude centroid and a radius to describe the 
sites to facilitate setup and analysis. During flight tests, 
these centroids were located with GPS and circles were 
painted on the grass at the defined radii. These circles 
provided a visual reference in the on-board videos and 
identified the site locations to the R/C car driver.  
Once a ditch site was selected, the centroid was set 
as the region of interest to the autopilot, which caused 
the autopilot to rotate the vehicle for camera sighting. 
When the vehicle was close enough to the targeted 
sight to allow imaging, input from the VAL was used 
to trigger a new site selection by the DSS for re-
routing the vehicle if needed. 
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Vision Assisted Landing (VAL) 
The vision assisted landing (VAL) subsystem was 
developed by Brigham Young University (BYU) under 
a grant to NASA.  BYU leveraged its Recursive-
Random Sample Consensus (R-RANSAC) multiple 
target tracking algorithm.  For this effort, R-RANSAC 
was configured and optimized to run on the Jetson TX-
2 research computer platform.  R-RANSAC uses a 
visual measurement front-end to process incoming 
video data and generate measurements that can be 
given to the Recursive-RANSAC Tracker. The 
Recursive-RANSAC algorithm values many low-
quality measurements over few high-quality 
measurements for robustness. The vision processing 
was performed with a calibrated camera in a three-step 
pipeline to find feature correspondences between 
images, compute a homography, and detect true object 
motion. Further information regarding the 
development of the VAL and R-RANSAC can be 
found in References 9 through 11 and in a future 
Journal publication.   
The VAL continually scanned for moving objects 
during the vehicle’s flight, though the prototype only 
used the object location data after S2D engagement. 
The VAL was responsible for the axial transformation 
from the camera FOV to north-east-down (NED) axis, 
and relied on vehicle location and attitude data from 
the autopilot to support this transformation. The 
prototype vehicle used a fixed-mounted camera angle 
of 45 degrees (as described earlier) which adversely 
inhibited the camera from imaging the ditch site 
selected until it was within a lateral range of the site 
approximately equal to the vehicle altitude, plus/minus 
the camera FOV. The VAL calculated the distance 
between each motion object and the ditch site centroid 
and tallied that object as an “intruder” in the site if the 
computed distance was less than the site’s radius. For 
these tests, a single intruder triggered a re-route request 
to the DSS.  
Nav Route Optimizer (NRO) 
The Nav Route Optimizer (NRO) creates the flight 
plan to the selected ditch site. In a mature S2D concept 
implementation, this could include optimization of 
vehicle performance, risk assessment, or area 
avoidance. For the prototype vehicle, the camera view 
angle was the only contributor to the optimization. The 
path to the ditch site was created as a straight line from 
the engagement point to the ditch site centroid and 
maintained the altitude of the vehicle until it reached a 
range equal to the vehicle’s altitude (to match the 45 
degree angle of the camera mount). This point was 
stored as the top-of-descent (TOD) waypoint (Figure 
6). The bottom-of-descent (BOD) waypoint was set to 
the centroid of the site.  
Each target waypoint as the flight progressed was 
supplied to the autopilot for vehicle steering in 
GUIDED mode.  Before reaching the TOD point, the 
vehicle cruised at its maximum speed. After crossing 
the TOD, the vehicle descended at 1.5 m/s, 4.9ft/s. If 
the selected ditch site changed for re-routing due to 
motion, the NRO created a new path to the alternate 
site using the vehicle’s altitude at re-route as the new 
cruise altitude. Motion was only created in the primary 
site for the tests performed. 
Intelligent Hub (IH) 
The intelligent hub (IH) provides the configuration, 
communication, and timing services needed between 
components. It also creates the subsystems and 
interfaces needed to communicate with external parts 
of the system. For the current prototype, this included 
only the autopilot and the camera.  
Adaptive Controls (AC) 
The adaptive controls (AC) component in the 
prototype is simply a place-holder for future 
development. The mature S2D concept envisions this 
component to inform control requirements for a 
disabled vehicle using information received from the 
HM. For example, rotor power balancing for a vehicle 
with a seized motor. The AC would be responsible for 
communicating additional performance changes to the 
NRO and the DSS since the adapted state may impact 
path optimization and the vehicle’s range capability.  
 
 
Figure 6 - Location of Top of Descent waypoint as generated 
by the NRO. 
Test site 
The test location was the City Environment Range 
for Testing Autonomous Integrated Navigation 
TOD 
Ditch Site 
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(CERTAIN) range in Hampton, VA, which is located 
at NASA Langley. Operations of sUAS are permitted 
WVLOS up to an altitude of 400ft AGL.  Range 1 of 
CERTAIN was used for the current testing effort as 
illustrated in Figure 7.  Weather limits required a 
visibility minimum of 3 miles with a minimum 1,000 ft 
AGL ceiling.  Wind limits were set at 20 mph, though 
most testing occurred in winds at 10 mph or less. 
 
   
 
Figure 7 - CERTAIN Range-1, NASA LaRC, Hampton, VA. 
(image approximately 1,500 ft by 800 ft). 
Flight test operations 
Flight test operations spanned several days.  After 
an airworthiness preflight, a nominal flight plan was 
loaded into the Pixhawk as illustrated in Figure 8.  The 
flight initiation point in the figure is denoted by the 
green balloon icon, and available ditch sites are 
denoted by the green circles. The red-cross indicates 
the approximate S2D engagement location.  
The flight test team included a safety pilot (SP), 
ground control station operator (GCSO), R/C car 
driver, and range safety office (RSO).  The SP was 
required for all CERTAIN flight operations to mitigate 
unexpected flight issues, and was responsible for the 
safe operation of the vehicle in flight. In addition, the 
SP engaged S2D with a switch on the R/C transmitter.  
The RSO provided range oversight and the required 
interface to the Langley Air Force Base tower.  The 
GCSO supported the preflight checklist and monitored 
vehicle systems during flight.  The GCSO was also 
responsible for transferring data from the research 
computer after each flight.  The R/C car driver drove 
the car in laps in and around the ditch site to induce 
motion for detection by the VAL.   
Once the vehicle was ready for takeoff, the Y-6 
was manually flown to an altitude of approximately 
50ft.  After the vehicle was stable at 50ft, a post-liftoff 
checklist was performed to again ensure that GPS, 
battery voltage, and 900 mHz telemetry links were in 
behaving nominally. The Y-6 was then transitioned to 
auto mode and began to climb towards the designated 
cruise altitude to fly the predetermined flight path 
starting at waypoint 1 at the desired altitude.  The 
nominal cruise speed selected was 10 m/s (22.4 mph).  
Maximum descent speed was 1.5 m/s (5 ft/sec).  
Testing was performed at cruise altitudes of either 60 
m (197 ft) or 120 m (394 ft).  The higher altitude 
represents potentially the highest altitude an sUAS 
would use for cruise conditions as described in 
Reference 1.   
These flight tests required the moving car operating 
in the primary selected ditch site as soon as the S2D 
system engaged, so the ditch site database was limited 
to include only two sites, with one substantially better 
than the other to trigger selection as the primary site 
choice. Having S2D select one specific ditch site for 
all testing facilitated use of the R/C car to simulate 
motion within the selected ditch site. The primary ditch 
site was located approximately 200 ft east of the 
launch location.  The alternate ditch site was located 
approximately 400 ft west-northwest of the launch 
location. Total flight times for the research flights were 
approximately 3.5 minutes. 
 
 
Figure 8 - Nominal flight path used for S2D testing along 
with primary and alternate ditch sites (green circles), and 
S2D engagement location (red cross). 
Test matrix 
A total of 13 data flights were conducted over two 
days. The R/C car was driven in the expected primary 
ditch site for approximately half of the tests. Tests 
conducted without the car were intended to test for 
false positives.  The test matrix is provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Test Matrix 
Altitude With Motion Without Motion 
60 m (197 ft) 3 3 
120 m (394 ft) 4 3 
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Results and discussion 
Tests of a prototype S2D system were performed at 
NASA LaRC during the late spring, 2018.  The 
objectives of the testing were to 1) demonstrate the 
feasibility of S2D system on a representative sUAS, 2) 
evaluate the performance of a prototype LSS, and 3) 
evaluate the integration of S2D elements along with a 
representative autopilot. 
Results indicate that the S2D correctly selected the 
best ditch site and the S2D VAL system had zero false 
positives over the conditions tested.  For the 6 test 
cases without the R/C motion present, the Y-6 research 
vehicle descended to an altitude of approximately 2m 
(6.6 ft) at which point the SP took control and landed 
the vehicle.  This is considered a significant result in 
that an effective S2D system should not re-route 
without a reason to do so.  Given the emergency 
situations possible during S2D engagements, needless 
re-routing could expose people to increased risk due to 
unnecessary flight of a potentially crippled aircraft. 
Results for motion detection are presented in Table 
2 as well as Figures 9, 10, and 11.  Table 2 presents the 
time required for the S2D VAL system to detect the 
presence of the R/C car human motion simulator from 
the time the car was observable in the camera’s field of 
view for both the 60 m (197 ft) and 120 m (394 ft) 
cruise altitudes.  Table 2 also presents the time 
required for the S2D system to determine that the 
detected motion was within the primary ditch site and 
trigger a re-route to the alternate ditch site.  Lastly, 
Table 2 presents the standard deviations for the time 
required to track and trigger reroutes.  Insufficient data 
exists to calculate standard deviations for the 60 m 
cruise altitude condition. 
Figure 9 presents the re-route altitude as a function 
of cruise altitude.  Figure 10 presents the time between 
the first observation of the R/C car in the camera’s 
FOV until a re-route was triggered.  Figure 11 presents 
the altitude lost during approach to the primary ditch 
site before a re-route was triggered.  Minimizing 
altitude lost during an approach to an unusable ditch 
site is critical since that could affect the vehicle’s 
capability to re-route to another location. 
As can be seen from Table 2, the VAL system was 
able to detect the presence of the car within 
approximately 1 to 2 seconds for both the 60 m (197 ft) 
and 120 m (394 ft) cruise altitudes.  This result 
indicates that the camera resolution (800x600@30 fps) 
in a fixed-mounted orientation is adequate to detect 
and track targets within a very short amount time from 
representative altitudes.   
At the cruise altitudes of 60 m (197 ft), and 120 m 
(394ft), the FOV of the camera was able to view 
approximately 46m (150 ft), and 91 m (299 ft), of 
ground respectively.  The approximate width of a pixel 
would then be 0.058 m (0.190 ft), and 0.115 m (0.377 
ft) respectively, for the 60 m (197ft) and 120 m (393 
ft) cruise conditions.  This analysis reveals that at the 
120 m cruise condition, the camera was able to put 
approximately 8 pixels onto the ~1m (3 ft) long R/C 
car.  For the 60 m cruise altitude, the number of pixels 
on the car increased to approximately 16. 
In addition, Table 2 also reveals that while the 
detection time of the motion in the ditch site was 
considered adequate, the time to trigger a re-route 
sometimes took much longer.  Higher re-route altitudes 
results in more desirable overall system performance 
as the vehicle can proceed to an alternate location 
higher and sooner and preserve potentially precious 
flight time.  For the 60 m cruise condition, S2D 
selected a re-route within an average of 11 seconds 
from the time the target was within the camera’s FOV 
and within the ditch site.  For the 120 m cruise 
condition, the average time for re-route increased to 40 
seconds with a 23.5 second standard deviation.   The 
difference between the detection time and the time to 
re-route involves the ability of the S2D system, 
combined with the vehicle’s sensors, to geolocate the 
detected target with the ditch site. 
It should be noted that one run for the 120 m cruise 
altitude condition contained prolonged out-of-bounds 
driving of the R/C car as the flight vehicle approached 
the TOD waypoint that could have adversely impacted 
the results for that run.  However, when the car re-
entered the ditch site approximately 20 seconds later, 
the vehicle did not immediately trigger a re-route.  
That run is considered valid data, yet needs to be 
acknowledge as a potential outlier.  Results for this run 
are illustrated in Figures 9, 10, and 11 as the outlying 
data point for the 120 m cruise condition. 
For these flight tests, the size of the ditch sites were 
60ft (18.3m) diameter circles.  The R/C car was 
randomly driven through the ditch sites.  The VAL 
reported all moving objects within the camera’s FOV, 
and then the reported locations of the motion objects 
were evaluated to determine if they were located 
within the ditch site boundaries. When true, a re-route 
was triggered.  Review of the resulting video, 
combined with the data from Table 2 and Figures 9, 
10, and 11, indicates that some type of angular error 
was likely present within the geolocation system 
because apparent geolocated position error varied with 
altitude and range to the vehicle.  These errors could be 
due to compass sensor errors, errors or latency in the 
reported vehicle states by the autopilot, or errors in the 
axial transformations to resolve the camera FOV to the 
north-east-down axis. Identification of this error source 
is on-going.   
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While specific requirements for time to re-route 
have not been established, minimization of wasted 
time in descent to an unusable ditch site is considered 
critical.  The longer the vehicle spends imaging an 
unusable the ditch site the less time available for re-
route to an alternate. 
The re-route altitudes ranged from a maximum of 
103m (338ft) to a minimum 31m (102ft).  These 
results are considered effective and verify the 
feasibility for a prototype S2D system for this type of 
vehicle. 
 
Table 2. Time to detect and track target, and 
subsequent re-route.  
Variable Cruise alt (m) 
Average 
(s) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(s) 
∆T track 60 1.3 - 
∆T track 120 1.5 0.6 
∆T re-route 60 11 - 
∆T re-route 120 40 23.5 
 
 
Figure 9 - Re-route altitude as a function of cruise altitude. 
 
Figure 10 - Re-route time as a function of cruise altitude. 
 
Figure 11 - Altitude lost during S2D descent as a function of 
cruise altitude. 
Summary 
Test of a prototype S2D system was performed at 
NASA LaRC during the late spring, 2018.  The 
objectives of the testing were to: 1) Demonstrate the 
feasibility of S2D system on a representative sUAS, 2) 
Evaluate the performance of a prototype LSS, and 3) 
Evaluate the integration of S2D elements along with a 
representative autopilot. 
Results from testing described previously indicate 
the feasibility of the S2D system to function 
adequately on a representative sUAS.  This is 
supported by the prototype S2D systems’ ability to 
select the best ditch site, create a route to that ditch 
site, support real-time imaging and landing site 
verification, and to effectively re-route when required 
due to sensed motion in the ditch site.   
A prototype Vision Assisted Landing (VAL) 
system was developed and evaluated over realistic 
emergency scenarios.  Results indicate that adequate 
performance was achieved along with areas defined to 
improve performance (geolocation). Required altitude 
to re-route ranged from as high as 103m (338ft) to as 
low as 31m (102ft), which is considered acceptable for 
this type of vehicle. 
Results from the integration of a prototype S2D 
system with a representative sUAS revealed that even 
very small and minimal sUAS could host an S2D 
system.  In addition, it is to be expected that as micro-
computers become more powerful and cameras 
decrease in size/weight, that a fully-functional S2D 
system, including landing site verification, is feasible 
for virtually all sUAS capable of beyond visual line of 
sight (BVLOS) operations. 
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Future work 
Future work includes an analysis of the vehicle 
sensors and axial transformation algorithms to identify 
the sources of the geolocation errors for the motion 
objects.  If accuracy of the sensors is found to be a 
driving factor, analysis will establish the geolocation 
error as a function of range and altitude to the ditch site 
to baseline system performance requirements for an 
S2D application.  Future work also includes a dynamic 
steer-to-clear control mode that will tactically 
maneuver the flight vehicle to avoid detected motion in 
the ditch site as a last resort if an alternate ditch site 
was not available.  In addition, integration of real-time 
risk assessment (RTRA) tools (such as described in 
Reference 12) is planned to dynamically categorize the 
risk of specific ditch sites as well as help to potentially 
shape or constrain the routes used to access them.  
Similarly, track data from the S2D VAL system can be 
provided to the RTRA system to update and verify its 
predictions.  Finally, integration of S2D within an 
advanced UAS control system architecture, such as 
described in Reference 13, is planned to ensure that 
S2D re-routes remain within cleared airspace when 
possible.   
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